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Our Straight-Laced Judges: Twenty Years
Later
by
RHONDA R. RivERA*
F am both surprised and thrilled to write the preface to the re-
printing of my article "Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position
of Homosexual Persons in the United States."'2 This article was
originally printed in 1979 and is now being re-printed for the 50'h
Anniversary of the Hastings Law Journal. I understand that my
article was chosen for this issue because the article received the fifth-
highest number of citations of all the articles that Hastings has ever
printed The very nice young man who first contacted me for this
project told me that Hastings would like an "updating" of my article,
due one month from his cal. 4 This request was so astounding 5 that I
summarily said "I can not do that!" and hung up. Later, upon
*Visiting Professor, The University of Arizona, James E. Rogers Law College of
the Law, Professor emeritus (The Ohio State University). Professor Rivera wishes to
thank Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Ph.D., Law II, for her excellent research for this article.
In addition, Professor Rivera thanks the University of Arizona for four and a half
wonderful years of teaching. This article is dedicated to Kitty Lowe MacSorley Rieley, the
author's mother, who died in 1998. Kitty always supported her daughter, even though she
regarded being gay as "socially inconvenient"!
1. The oft-used rule of legal writing that one should NEVER use the word "I" creates
a lot of passive sentences and is silly!
2. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
3. The article has 93 cites in Shepard's and 43 cites in the Social Sciences Citation
Index.
4. The article has been updated but not recently. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent
Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L REv. 311 (1980-1981) [hereinafter
Rivera, Developments]; Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the
Mid-Eighties, Part 1, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 459 (1985)[hereinafter Rivera, Queer Law 1];
Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part I1, 11 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 275 (1986) [hereinafter Rivera, Queer Law II].
5. The article is 156 pages in length and has 938 footnotes and covers a span of years
from to 1905 to 1979. The article took me four years to research and a whole summer,
seven days a week from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., to draft.
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reflection, I decided that communications were crossed. I called the
editor-in-chief, who assured me that Hastings did not want me to
update the article in a one-month period. Rather, what Hastings
wanted was (1) the story of how the article came to be written, (2)
what the reaction was to the article that I knew of, and (3) what were
my observations and reflections on what has happened to gay and
lesbian law in those twenty years, 1979-1999. I agreed to do the
preface.
How the Article Came to Be Or How Not to Get Tenure
For a very short time in my life, I was the Assistant Dean at the
University of Michigan Law School,6 from July 1974 to June 1976.
During that period, the Gay Academic Union (GAU) 7 chose Ann
Arbor for its annual meeting. The committee members for the
meeting decided that a workshop should be created on "Gay
Employment Issues." I was told that the committee searched both
Ann Arbor and Detroit for a lawyer who would speak on gay
employment issues. The committee asked lawyers who, in particular,
were associated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
the National Lawyer's Guild (NLG), or who were union lawyers. No
lawyer would do the workshop! All of these organizations are now
very committed to the rights of lesbians and gay men, but, in the 70's,
members of these organizations often reflected the same attitudes as
the rest of America. I had recently helped a number of students start
the Feminist Law Clinic (FLC) at University of Michigan.8 One of
those students knew someone in GAU and volunteered me to do the
workshop. When asked, I said I would try but that I knew nothing
about the subject. I asked the students, who were members of the
FLC, to help me with the research. What the students found both
astounded and angered me. Literally, the subject of the legal position
6. The school may deny this statement. I was told when I left Michigan that, while I
had done a very good job as Dean, I was just too student-oriented. Many thought that
when I became a law professor I would lose this immature attitude. 'Fraid not: here at
Arizona, I remain as committed to students as ever. At Arizona, one is rewarded for such
an attitude.
7. I was honored in 1983 by the Gay Academic Union for the Hastings article with
the Evelyn Hooker Award. The Gay Academic Union, also known as the Lesbian and
Gay Academic Union, is a national and local activist organization which began in the
1970s and which still exists on some campuses.
8. Yes, feminists existed in those days. No, the law school did not pay me for this
endeavor. However, in 1975, Ann Arbor N.O.W. gave me my favorite award: "Uppity
Woman of the Year."
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of gay men and lesbians was virtually unaddressed 9 in legal literature
except for a plethora of articles on sodomy and solicitation. The
pervasive effect of the civil law on the lives of gay men and lesbians in
America was almost totally ignored. In fact, the legal indices did not
have a subject title for homosexuality except under criminal matters.
Yet, I knew from my own knowledge, gained mostly from reading gay
and lesbian newspapers, that the civil law affected gay men and
lesbians in many ways. The law determined whether they could keep
custody of their biological children.10 The law determined their fate
in their employment if they were "out" or were "outed."" The law
determined if their wills leaving property to a life-partner would be
successfully contested. 2 The law determined if a gay teacher could
keep his or her credential, etc. 3
I prepared for the GAU workshop, as best I could, and it went
remarkably well. However, I was still appalled that no one had
addressed the broad issue of the effect of the civil law on the lives of
gay men and lesbians. I was ranting about this subject to a lesbian
friend, and she said, "well, if no one else is doing it, you must!" At
9. One exception was a very prescient article by Irving Kovarsky entitled Fair
Employment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 527 (1971). Later, when I actually
did the research myself, I found a number of interesting articles written in the 60's. See,
e.g., Comment, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969); Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465
(1969); Ralph Slovenko, Sexual Deviation: Response to an Adaptational Crisis, 40 U.
COLO. L. REv. 222 (1968). Moreover, if computer-assisted research had existed then, I
suspect that I would have discovered more articles and more cases.
10. See Rivera, supra note 2, Part X, at 883-904; Rivera, Developments, supra note 4,
Part III-C, at 327-36; Rivera, Queer Law II, Part III-C and Part III-D, supra note 4, at 327-
98. See also Rivera, Legal Issues in Gay and Lesbian Parenting, in GAY AND LESBIAN
PARENTS 199-227 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987)[hereinafter Rivera, Legal Issues].
11. In those days, persons were often outed by inference or accident; few gay persons
engaged in personal self-disclosure for obvious reasons. The first case where I knew of a
person who voluntarily disclosed their sexual orientation was in the case of Leonard
Matlovich, the member of the U.S. Air Force who wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force
and "outed" himself to test the law then applicable. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 591 F. 2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978). I must
admit that living in the mid-west, I was less aware of these issues than someone who lived
on either coast. For a discussion on employment discrimination, see "Employment and
Related Occupational Discrimination" in Rivera, supra note 2, at 805-74. See also Rivera,
Developments, supra note 4, Part II, at 312-24 (covering 1979-1981); "Employment and
Related Occupational Discrimination" in Rivera, Queer Law I, supra note 4, at 464-536.
12. See Rivera, supra note 2, Part XI, at 904-08.
13. For teaching in public schools, see id. at 860-74. See also Rivera, Developments,
supra note 4, at 319 (covering the years 1979-1981, in which Rivera reported "[n]o
published decisions affecting state employees or teachers have occurred in the two-year
period under consideration..."); Rivera, Queer Law I, supra note 4, at 514-35 (discussing
issues in teaching).
first, I was taken aback; I was not a legal scholar. However, I decided
that I should at least try. I started gathering materials from many
sources.
In 1976, I became an Assistant Professor at The Ohio State
University Law School (OSU). I taught Contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), both of which I loved. However, I
continued gathering materials about gay men and lesbians and the
civil law. As a new law professor, I knew that I had to write.
Professor Douglass Whaley, 14 my mentor at OSU, told me to pick a
narrow topic in the UCC and write about it for my first piece, then go
on and do something more ambitious. At his suggestion, I chose
UCC section 2-105,15 mainly because no one else had ever addressed
it.'6 I began desultory work on the UCC article, but, truthfully, the
subject never engaged me.' 7 I kept doing research on gay and lesbian
issues.18 Sometime in the fall of 1978, someone from the Hastings Law
Journal called me and asked if I would do the lead article in a
symposium on homosexuality and the law. To this day, I do not know
who gave Hastings my name. I said "yes." I finished the research in
early 1979 (the research was never really finished; I just stopped for a
while). I spent the summer of 1979 drafting and editing the article.
Until I started writing, I did not realize what I had promised to do. I
labored through the summer, every day, and wrote the article and all
the 938 footnotes personally. 19 When the draft was ready at the end
of the summer, I sent it off to Hastings.
Suddenly, I realized that the only article I had for my promotion
to Associate Professor and my application for tenure was the
Hastings article. The UCC article was not done. Since then, I have
been told how brave I was to submit the Hastings article for my
tenure piece. I must admit of no courage; I had no other choice.20
14. James W. Shocknessy Professor of Law, Ohio State University of Law. Professor
Whaley was a wonderful mentor. I later co-authored a textbook with him, entitled
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN SALES, published by Little Brown in 1983.
15. UCC section 2-105 is the section in the Uniform Commercial Code that defines
"goods."
16. With good reason. The section and its consequences were incredibly boring, and
the substance would not fill many pages.
17. Just take a look at the final article. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Identification of Goods
and Casualty to Identified Goods Under Article Two of the UCC, 13 IND. L. REV. 637
(1980).
18. For the problems involved in researching gay and lesbian legal issues, see Rivera,
supra note 2, at 807 and Rivera, Queer Law I, supra note 4, at 461 n.7.
19. Thank goodness the Hastings folks blue-booked for me, or I might still be
writing.
20. In addition, I was incredibly naive about law schools and law school politics.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
April 1999] OUR STRAIGHT-LACED JUDGES: TWENTY YEARS LATER 1183
Shortly after I submitted the article, my assigned Hastings editor
called me. After various pleasantries, the editor told me that I had to
revise the article substantially. He said that I had to cut out all the
facts about the gay litigants; nobody was interested in their lives prior
to the case at hand. Secondly, he told me that I had to cut out all the
quotes from judges, which admittedly were many. "Just make the
article like Prosser," he said. I had spent a lot of time and energy
getting the facts behind the cases; I was very discouraged. I told the
editor that the reason for all the personal facts about the litigants was
to illustrate the injustice perpetrated on them. All the judicial quotes
were to illustrate the prejudice of the judges.21 This editor was
unconvinced. I thought about this demand over the weekend and
decided I could not do what was demanded. I called on Monday and
told the editor that I would not make those kinds of changes; if
Hastings insisted, I would withdraw the article. (Was I nuts? What
would my tenure be based on?) The editor was shaken. (After all,
my article was the lead article of the symposium.) Shortly thereafter,
the Editor-in-Chief called. I explained my reasons to him. Luckily
for me, he understood my reasons. He gave me a new editor who did
the hard edit that the article certainly needed.22 Publication was just
around the corner when another editor called me about the title. This
editor wanted to change the title of the article. He wanted to strike
"Our Straight-Laced Judges" and leave only "The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States." By then, I was bold.
"No," I said. He acquiesced graciously but said that a spelling
mistake existed in the title, namely, that "Straight" should be "Strait"
I refused the well-meant, but innocent, suggestion2 3
21.1 do not like the word " homophobia." Webster's dictionary does not have a
definition for homophobia. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY,
(2d ed. 1979)[hereinafter WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH]; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S THIRD]. However,
the American Heritage dictionary defines homophobia as "a fear of homosexuals."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY 619 (2d ed. 1991). The reasons for prejudice against
gay men and lesbians seems to me to be more complex than just fear.
22. That editor, Lynn Loacker, graduated from Hastings in 1979 and is now in private
practice in Seattle, Washington. I have always been grateful to Ms. Loacker for her fine
job.
23. Dear reader, if you cannot figure out the pun, try a dictionary. The 1979
Webster's dictionary defined "strait" as narrow, close, not broad, tight, confined, close,
intimate, strict, rigorous, exacting. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH, supra note 21, at
1798. In contrast, "straight" was defined as "having the same direction throughout its
length; having no curvature or angularity; not crooked, bent bowed, wavy, curly, etc." Id.
at 1797. Note: the 1993 Webster's definition of "straight" has changed slightly to "without
deviation, delay or other interruption." WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 21, at 2254.
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The article was published. I received tenure. 24  I was then
relatively safe in my position, an openly gay tenured law professor2
In 1980-1981, I wrote a short update of the article in the Drake Law
Review, entitled "Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law.126
In 1985 and 1986, I wrote more comprehensive updates for the
Dayton Law Review, entitled "Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in
the Mid-Eighties, Part I and Part II. "27
Reactions to the Article Or How I Became the "Mother" of
Sexual Orientation Laws
Although the article was supposed to be so ground-breaking, I
personally received very little direct comment on it for many, many
years. I think that, in the early 1980's, most people were terrified to
talk about the issue. My colleague, Professor Larry Herman,29 did
remark that I should have published each section separately, and then
I would have had ten lines in the Legal Index of Periodicals, not just
one. Other people, much more scholarly than I, began to write in the
field, and most, but not all, cited to my article as the foundation from
which they proceeded. My two favorite citations are found in (1) Bill
Rubenstein's preface to his casebook where he describes how he
educated himself about gay law: "In the succeeding semesters, I
slowly pieced together a self-education, relying primarily on Rhonda
Rivera's remarkable series of queer law articles," 30 and in (2) the
index to Richard Mohr's book on gay philosophy: "General trends in
gay law are best tracked through the field-establishing works of
Rhonda R. Rivera ... -31
24. An altogether different war story!
25. I tried to make the most of this bully pulpit for the next 20 years. Yet another
story!
26. See generally Rivera, Developments, supra note 4.
27. See generally Rivera, Queer Law I, supra note 4; Rivera, Queer Law II, supra note
4.
28. Art Leonard, of course, is the father. The conception, obviously, was asexual!
Professor Arthur Leonard is one of the very first and very finest scholars in the field of
Sexual Orientation Law. He and I founded the Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues Section
(GLLIS) of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS). Professor Leonard is well
known for his Gay and Lesbian Law Notes, a monthly publication that discusses current
cases and other legal events with regard to gay and lesbian persons. Professor Leonard is
at New York Law School.
29. President's Club Professor of Law at Ohio State, now Professor emeritus.
30. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1997).
31. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW
339 (1988).
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Today, the articles about gay men and lesbians and the civil law
are numerous and on subjects that I would never have conceived in
my wildest imagination in 1979.32
I did receive, starting in 1979, some requests to speak at various
conferences, such as Women and the Law. I was not invited to speak
at an AALS meeting on this subject until the late 80's. 33
The commentary that I have held most dear are the remarks that
have come from former law students, both lawyers and law
professors, all younger than I. Many of them have come to me and
thanked me for writing the article and saving their sanity. They said
that, when they were in law school, they were not "out" and were
terrified. They said that they knew nothing of the law about lesbians
and gay men and that their teachers certainly never included such
material in their courses. These folks looked up "homosexuality"
secretly and spent many a night reading the article with the Hastings
cover hidden behind some hornbook cover (perhaps, even Prosser!).
From the article, they knew they were not alone, and they knew that
other persons such as themselves had succeeded.
These accolades were all I ever needed, and I treasure them
today. I look at the article now and can see its mistakes and rough
spots. Once, I went back to a section that dealt with "due process"
and thought I had mistakenly failed to include the three levels of due
process analysis. Then I realized that those levels had not yet come
into common usage.
While I did do three updates of the article, I did not complete the
last update. AIDS hit our community, and I wrote in that area for
quite some time.34 By the time that I had the time to update the
article, many other articles had been published in the area, and
frankly, I could add nothing different or new, in my estimation. I was
also older and more tired. I think that by now I am the
"grandmother" of sexual orientation law.
The parts of the articles of which I am most proud are the
32. Most of these articles have in their titles the words "paradigm," "deconstruction,"
"alterity," "otherness," "queering," or "essentialism."
33. As I remember, I was asked by the section on Property Law to be on a panel
about wills to discuss the issues facing gay men and lesbians in this area.
34. See Rhonda R. Rivera, The Legal Issues of Death and Dying, in AIDS LAW AND
POLICY 467 (Arthur Leonard ed., 1995); Rhonda R. Rivera, The Legal Issues of Death and
Dying, in AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS 467 (Michael L. Closen et al. eds., 1989);
Rhonda R. Rivera, The Military, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 221
(Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987); Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some
Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 883 (1989).
sections on the use of language.35 I have waged a never-ending battle
to have the word "homosexual," a pseudo-medical term, used only as
an adjective and never as a noun. ("He is a homosexual soldier," not
"he is a homosexual.") The use of "homosexual" as a noun eroticizes
and, in a sense, trivializes a gay person's life. In fact, I try not to use
the word at all and now use "same-sex" in its place. I realized that
"sexual preference" was misleading as a term and changed to "sexual
orientation. '36 I tried to push "life-partner" rather than "lover," but I
think that "domestic partner" is more common and probably just as
accurate. I find using "gay men and lesbians" in my articles
refreshing and pleasing. In my last two updates for Dayton, I insisted
on calling the area "Queer Law," hardly original or radical now.
Another favorite of mine is to refer to persons who identify as
heterosexual as "non-gays. '37 Non-gay people should not be made
one-dimensional any more than gay people. Interestingly, when I
used this phrase in a speech, one person said that the term was
demeaning to persons who identify as heterosexuals. Moreover, the
term, she said, was so negative! I said, "yes?"
Every author wants to be cited by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court did cite to the whole symposium once but not to my
article specifically. However, the information cited did, in likelihood,
come from my section of the symposium. The case in question,
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County,
Ohio,38 involved a denial of certiorari with a strong dissent by
Brennan and Marshall. So while the case turned out badly from a gay
rights point of view, the symposium did get cited in the Brennan and
Marshall dissent. Personally, I consider the citation an honor!
Reflections on the Legal Position of Gay Men and Lesbians in
the United States in 1999
Both persons from Hastings asked me to describe the "progress"
that gay men and lesbians have made in the United States in terms of
their legal status. Both times, I said that I was not sure exactly what
"progress" had occurred. Both were taken aback, as if the "progress"
35. See Rivera, supra note 2, at 800-04. See also Rivera, Queer Law I, supra note 4, at
463-64.
36. I absolutely REFUSE to enter the fray between the essentialists and the social
constructionists.
37. I was pleased when I read the flyleaf of Betty DeGeneres' book about her
daughter to see that she used the word "non-gay."
38. 470 U.S. 1009, 1015 n.9 (1985) (concluding that the free speech rights of the
teacher were not violated when the teacher was fired for disclosing her orientation).
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were self-evident. I am not so sure. I think the glass may be half
empty, rather than half full. You decide 3 9
Let's start with criminal law. Although my articles did not deal,
at length, with criminal law, most of the areas of the law that I
discussed were seriously affected by the sodomy laws. While, in the
past, gay men probably have been affected by the criminal law more
often than have lesbians,40 the criminalization of gay and lesbian
behavior 4i affects all gay people, even today. Lesbians and gay men
still lose custody of their children because they are considered
immoral because the law makes their behavior criminal. One of the
rationales for the current military policy, besides the "morale" issue,
is that gay men and lesbians might be considered potential criminals
in some states and overseas.
In 1979, the only Supreme Court case on the books dealing with
the constitutionality of sodomy laws was Doe v. the Commonwealth of
Virginia.42 In Doe, a three-judge federal panel upheld the Virginia
sodomy law against a constitutional attack based on the right to
privacy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. However, even after
Doe, legal analysts could legitimately state that, for various reasons,
the final answer on sodomy was not in. However, in 1986, the
Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick,43 and the final answer
was in. The Court held that "homosexuals" had no right to privacy
under the Constitution and that states could legitimately make
sodomy criminal.44 Bowers is still good law. In 1979, 29 states made
sodomy a crime,45 but today only 17 states still do.46 Five of those
39. I will discuss only in a cursory and summary manner the following areas: Criminal
Law, Employment, Military, and Custody. I am going to provide one broad footnote for
each area and only provide individual case names when absolutely necessary. Otherwise,
I might get to 938 footnotes again!
40. For an example of lesbians caught by the snares of the criminal law, see People v.
Livermore, 155 N. W. 2d 711 (Mich. App. 1967)(police officers received a complaint about
the activity of two women in a tent in a campground. The officers listened outside the tent
and decided that unlawful activity was occurring. The women were arrested and convicted
of a felony-gross indecency between women.).
41. One of my favorite cases is a Georgia case where the court held that women can
not commit sodomy. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 200 S.E. 799 (Ga. 1939). Subsequently,
Georgia changed the definitions under its sodomy laws to make sure women could commit
sodomy. The Georgia law that covered both same-sex and different-sex sodomy was
upheld as to same sex couples in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S.
985 (1976). See also Rivera, supra note 2, at 944-45 (1979), and in particular, n.912 for
more citations and information regarding this case.
43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44. Id. at 196.
45. See Rivera, supra note 2, at 951 n.a.
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seventeen states intentionally criminalize solely same-sex sodomy.4 7
However, under Bowers, every state could re-criminalize same-sex
sodomy without violating the Constitution. Thus, gay men and
lesbians live at the whim of state legislators 4s
Some legal analysts argue that Romer v. Evans49 portends a
change with regard to the sodomy laws; however, others say Evans
will not inevitably lead to such a result. In 1992, Colorado citizens
passed an amendment to the Colorado Constitution banning any state
action to prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians.50 Four
46. The twelve states that criminalize both different-sex and same-sex sodomy are
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah and Virginia. See Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund Inc., February 19, 1999 Pamphlet, Sodomy Law State-by-State Status
Report [hereinafter Lambda Pamphlet]. The Lambda pamphlet did not include Georgia.
O.C.G. Section 16-6-2 (1999) still criminalizes sodomy in Georgia. However, in Powell v.
Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court held that 16-6-2, "insofar as it criminalizes the
performance of private, un-forced, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between
persons legally able to consent," violates the right of privacy found in the Georgia
Constitution. 510 S.E. 2d 18,26 (Ga. 1998).
47. The five states that criminalize only same-sex sodomy are Arkansas, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. See Lambda Pamphlet, supra note 46. Not to be
outdone, the Missouri State House of Representatives proposed bill 850/851 to expand the
definitions of sexual offenses, making same-sex sexual activity a crime. The bill allows a
person to be convicted of "forcible sodomy, statutory sodomy, deviate sexual misconduct,
and sexual misconduct in the first degree if there is a sexual act involving the genitals of a
person and the hand of another person." H.B. 850 & 851, 90th Gen. Ass'y., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 1999)(emphasis added). Currently, persons can only be convicted of these crimes if
the sexual act involves the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, or anus of
another person. This proposed addition to the Missouri statue, making mutual
masturbation a crime, appears to make sure that no same-sex sexual behavior escapes the
clutches of the law.
48. Given the quality of most state legislators, the thought is terrifying!
49. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
50. Amendment 2 repealed by state-wide referendum the anti-discrimination
ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Various
municipalities in Colorado had enacted such ordinances. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
court in Romer v. Evans, explained:
[Y]et Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind
these provisions. It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any
level of state or local government designed to protect the named class, a class
we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians. The amendment
reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the state of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
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years later, in Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court found the amendment
unconstitutional. The basis for the decision was the due process
clause, rather than the right to privacy. The Court said that it was
applying "rational basis" scrutiny rather than "strict scrutiny," the
highest test used only for cases involving fundamental rights or
suspect classes. In effect, the Court found that the Colorado
Amendment was irrational because the only reason for its enactment
was "animus" against a disfavored class of persons.51 Many criticized
the Court for insufficient analysis to justify its conclusion. 52 I would
argue that in its collective (majority) gut, the Court knew such an
amendment was wrong in our democracy and that if the Court
allowed the amendment to be upheld, two classes of citizens would
automatically be created under the Constitution.
However, Evans was undercut by what the Supreme Court did
shortly thereafter. The citizens of the City of Cincinnati passed an
Amendment to the City Charter very similar to Colorado's
Amendment 2, popularly referred to as Issue 3.53 The federal district
persons to have any claim of minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination"
Id. at 624 (quoting the COLO. CONST., art. II, § 306).
51. Using a "rational basis test," the Court found that Amendment 2 fails, indeed
defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of
imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests.
Id. at 653. (Scalia J. dissenting).
52. Justice Scalia in his dissent said, "[t]oday's opinion has no foundation in American
Constitutional law, and barely pretends to." Id at 652,1637.
53. In response to Cincinnati City Ordinance No. 79-1991 ("Equal Employment
Opportunity Ordinance," or "EEO"), and Cincinnati City Ordinance No. 490-1992
("Human Rights Ordinance" or "HRO."), and, in large part, due to the activism of an
organization called "Take Back Cincinnati" (later changed to "Equal Rights Not Special
Rights"), Issue 3 was proposed and passed on November 3, 1993. See Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 421-22 (S.D.
Ohio, 1994). EEO prohibited discrimination in city employment based upon sexual
orientation, as well as race, color, sex, disability, religion, national or ethnic origin, age,
HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status. See id. HRO prohibited
discrimination in private employment, public accommodations, and housing based upon
sexual orientation as well as race, color, sex, disability, religion, national or ethnic origin,
age, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status. See id. Issue 3 (also
known as Article XII) states that "[nlo special class status may be granted based upon
sexual orientation, conduct or relationships." The text (as cited by the trial court):
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
court found the amendment constitutionally insufficient. 54 The Sixth
Circuit, however, upheld the amendment.55 This case was also
granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.56 After Evans, the Supreme
Court sent the case back to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in
light of that decision. The Sixth Circuit framed the issue anew with
Evans in mind and, using dubious logic, came to the same conclusion,
namely, the Amendment was constitutional. 57 When this decision was
appealed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.58
What was this denial supposed to mean? States cannot pass laws
solely based on animus, 59 but cities can? Was the Supreme Court
resorting to its former days of not taking gay cases unless absolutely
forced to? Who knows? In a sense, we are back where we were when
the Court denied certiorari in Doe.60 For many years after Doe, legal
experts argued the effect of the denial of certiorari on the status of
sodomy. Now, the effect of the Cincinnati case on Evans is unclear
and subject to various interpretations. Is the constitutional glass half
empty or half full?
One of the most precious rights any person can have is the right
to employment based on merit and not based on immutable personal
characteristics. Employment puts food on the table and a roof over
one's head. "Coming out" as a political act fades into insignificance
when one can not find a home or a job. The right to employment has
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis
to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment....
Id. at 422 (providing a full text of Issue 3).
54. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The
trial court held Issue 3 violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights to free speech and
association as well as plaintiff's right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
Moreover, the trial court found Issue 3 unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 449.
55. Judgment reversed and vacated by Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
56. Certiorari granted, judgement vacated by Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
57. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997).
58. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365
(1998).
59. Trust me, this charter amendment was based on "animus." I participated in the
fight at the polls and had a very minor role in the litigation that followed the passage of
Issue 3. The proponents of Issue 3 used the exact same language that was used in
Colorado, calling protection from discrimination for gay men and lesbians, "special
rights." See Rhonda R. Rivera, Where are We? Anti-Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual Ballot Attacks
Today, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 555 (1994). My article was again the introductory article to a
symposium.
60. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
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important national economic implications. If people are chosen for
jobs based on factors other than merit, then the best-suited persons
are not doing the job, and the result would be damage to our free
enterprise system. Congress has protected the jobs of black persons
and other racial minorities, women, the handicapped, the aged, and
persons of various ethnic heritages against invidious discrimination in
private sector employment on the basis of this economic reasoning.6 1
Sexual orientation is not among the protected classes. Since Title VII
was enacted, gay men and lesbians have sought protection under the
law on the basis that the prohibition against "sex" discrimination
included a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. However, courts routinely deny such protection and
state that Title VII does not extend its protections to gay men and
lesbians.62 Nationally, the private sector can legitimately discriminate
against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation. Therefore,
gay employees live at the whim of their private employers.
However, since I wrote in 1979, eleven states and numerous
cities, counties, and other political bodies have enacted prohibitions
against sexual orientation discrimination.63 Technically, gay men and
61. Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 is found at 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e et.
seq. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 is found at 42 U.S.C. sections 6101-6107 (1995).
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is found at 42 U.S.C. sections 12101-12213.
62. See Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (holding Title VII did not forbid discrimination based on "affectional or sexual
preference, of the applicant, despite the fact that the plaintiff was not characterized as a
homosexual person but as "effeminate"); Voyales v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403
F. Supp. 456, 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding Title VII does not protect the employment
rights of transsexuals, and, in dicta, broadening that lack of protection to cover
homosexuals and bisexuals as well). See DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII applied only to discrimination on
basis of gender and not sexual preference); Macauley v. Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination, 397 N.E.2d 670, 670-71 (Mass. 1979)(refusing to extend term
"sex" in Title VII to cover sexual preferences). See also Rivera, Queer Laws 1, supra note
4, at 465 for more discussion on gay men and lesbians' unsuccessful attempts to bring
sexual orientation under the ambit of Title VII, including discussion of Valdes v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that a
female employee would be entitled to Title VII relief if she could show that an employer's
policy against employing gay persons was not applied uniformly); and Wright v. Methodist
Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that the discharge of a
male employee for rejecting advances allegedly made by his male supervisor constituted a
violation of Title VII). Wright was essentially a same-sex sexual harassment case, a bit
before its time. The Supreme Court has just ruled on this issue in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Incorporated, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998). In an opinion by Justice
Scalia (of all people!), expressing the unanimous view of the court, the court held that
workplace sexual harassment is actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII, even
where the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex.
63. According to the Human Rights Campaign, as of December 2, 1998, eleven states,
lesbians are protected in these jurisdictions. Unfortunately, many of
these laws, particularly in cities and other local jurisdictions, do not
have significant penalties attached to them and thus are, I suspect,
violated with impunity. In addition, the enforcement mechanisms of
local governments, as opposed to state governments, are usually
weak.
However, in some respects, much has changed in the corporate
sector. Corporations have learned that gay persons make good
employees, and numerous corporations have policies that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, when gay
litigants have taken these same corporations to court for failure to
follow their own policies, the courts have found, for various reasons,
that the policies can not be legally enforced.64 In that sense, the
policies in the private sector are public relations pieces rather than
legal protections. Except in eleven states, gay employees still work at
the whim of their employers.
What of the public sector?65 The federal government was one of
the biggest offenders in the area of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Until the early 60's, few dismissed employees
even challenged these actions. In 1969, in the case of Norton v.
Macy,66 the D.C. Circuit finally recognized the due process rights of
gay men and lesbians who were federal employees. The court held
such persons could not be fired without (1) a hearing and (2) a
rational basis for the action; this latter requirement is called a
"rational nexus" test. Supplying a rational basis for firing gay
employees proved very difficult in most civilian government jobs, and
the amount of discrimination declined. The Carter Administration in
1979 changed the civil service rules to give gay men and lesbians more
protection. Not until the current Clinton Administration has any
administration openly hired gay men and lesbians.67
27 counties, and 136 cities had passed anti-discrimination sexual orientation legislation.
See Mireya Navarro, 2 Decades On... Miami Endorses Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
December 2, 1998, at Al.
64. See Joachim v. AT&T Information Systems, 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam)(holding employee handbook did not create any contractual relation, even when
company handbook prohibited discrimination based on sexual preference).
65. See Rivera, supra note 2, at 813-25; Rivera, Developments, supra note 4, at 317-19;
Rivera, Queer Laws I, supra note 4, at 483-86.
66. 417 F.2d 1161,163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
67. For example, in 1993, the Clinton White House nominated my old friend Roberta
Achtenberg to be Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. She became the highest-ranking
openly gay public official in the country. See Clinton Names SF Lesbian as Fair Housing
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Now, every department of the federal government has issued an
executive order prohibiting employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Finally, in 1998, the President issued an executive
order covering the entire federal government, except the military, of
course.68 Executive orders are not laws. The general understanding
is that an executive order can be rescinded by the next executive. 69
So, while welcome, the actions of the current administration are not
as protective as would be a law enacted by Congress.70 So is the glass
Chief, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1993, at A4; Adam Nagovney, Dole Calls Public
Housing One of the 'Last Bastions of Socialism,' N. Y. TIMES, April 30,1996, at B8.
68. See The Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (1998). See also Louis
Freedberg, Republicans Trying To Kill Gay Order, S. F. CHRON., July 8, 1998, at Al, for
backlash against President Clinton's executive order, issued three months earlier.
69. On December 30, 1983, Governor Richard Celeste, a liberal Democrat, signed
Executive Order No. 83-64. This Order prohibited discrimination in state employment
against certain enumerated classes, including gay men and lesbians. This Executive Order
had no "sunset" provision. Governor Celeste signed this Order to fulfill a campaign
pledge made to this author and other Ohio gay rights leaders. Governor Celeste was
succeeded by Governor George Voinovich, a Republican. On December 31, 1998, at the
end of his term, Governor Voinovich issued Executive Order No. 98-42v that sunset all the
executive orders of previous governors, with the exception of sixteen orders. Among the
orders "sunset" was Celeste's order prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. In addition, this action meant that Ohio had no Equal Employment
Opportunity Executive Order at all. Governor Voinovich was succeeded by Governor
Taft, another Republican. On June 22, 1999, in answer to a request of the Ohio
Department of Administrative Services, Taft issued Executive Order 99-18T. This Order
prohibited discrimination in state employment in vague and general terms. No protected
classes were enumerated. On August 16, 1999, Governor Taft, in response to criticism,
issued Order 99-25T to supplant No. 99-18T. This Order again prohibited discrimination
in state employment; however, it made reference only to federal and state protected
classifications. Thus, the prohibition against discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation was gone! Letter from Elliot T. Fishman, Esq., former Counsel to the Ohio
Department of Administrative Services under Governor Celeste (September 17, 1999) (on
file with author).
70. Steven A. Holmes, The Nation; Civil Rights Dance Lesson: The Tiny Step Forward,
N.Y. TIMES, September 15, 1996, § 4, at 5, Col. 1. After the approval by the Senate of the
United States of the Defense of Marriage Act, a bill was introduced that would prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. That bill was defeated by
one vote.
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) "was approved by a lopsided 85-14 vote amid
strident calls for lawmakers to defend the sanctity of heterosexual marriage." Id.
President Clinton signed DOMA into law on September 21, 1996. In H.R. Rep. No. 104-
664, at 2, the purposes of DOMA were said to be two in number: "First to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. The second is to protect the rights of the
States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex
unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that might attend the recognition
by one State of the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses. See id. at 2.
"To achieve these purposes" section two provides that no State shall be required to accord
full faith and credit to a marriage license issued by another state if it relates to a
relationship between persons of the same sex." Id. Section three "defines the terms
half empty or half full?
A third major area of legal importance for gay men and lesbians
is child-rearing. 71 Gay people want the right to keep their biological
children when they divorce, want the right to adopt, and want the
right to be foster parents. Gay young men even want to be Boy
Scouts and Boy Scout leaders.72 All these rights are problematic and
hardly secure.
Some of the first cases where the issue of "homosexuality" was
raised were the custody cases. Gay men or lesbians married people of
the opposite sex and, subsequently, recognized their sexual
orientation. A divorce soon followed. In the days of these early
cases, the 70's and early 80's, a general presumption existed in favor
of the mother as custodian and in favor of fathers receiving liberal
visitation rights. These presumptions did not hold when one of the
parents was gay. In the early days, most, if not all courts, considered
homosexuality per se a reason to deny custody and, in some cases,
even to deny visitation. Usually, mothers and fathers were denied
ordinary parental rights for a variety of stated reasons: (1) contact
with the gay parent would turn the child gay; (2) all gay persons were
"child molesters" and would abuse their own children; (3) gay persons
were per se immoral and, therefore, custody or visitation was not in
the "best interest of the child"; and (4) the child or children would
'marriage' and 'spouse' for the purposes of federal law only, to reaffirm that they refer
exclusively to relationships between persons of the opposite sex. See id. Section two
certainly confronts the full faith and credit section of the Constitution and will most likely
encounter a constitutional challenge. Section three is less benign because by defining
"spouse" for the first time by federal law, the section has serious, adverse consequences
for federal employees seeking partnership benefits. For a more flexible view of same-sex
marriage, see David Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs of Lesbian and Male Couples, 95 Mich L. Rev. 447 (1996).
71. See footnote 10 for citations on Rivera's articles on "custody."
72. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270,289 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (declaring BSA a public accommodation that did not fall within exception in Law
Against Discrimination. The court concluded: "[t]here is absolutely no evidence before
us, empirical or otherwise, supporting a conclusion that a gay scoutmaster, solely because
he is a homosexual, does not possess the strength of character necessary to properly care
for, or to impart BSA humanitarian ideals to the young boys in his charge. Nothing before
us even suggests that a male, simply because he is gay, will somehow undermine BSA's
fundamental beliefs and teachings. Plaintiff's exemplary journey through the BSA ranks
is testament enough that these stereotypical notions about homosexuals must be
rejected."). But see, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 952
P.2d 218, 220 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the Boy Scouts were not a business establishment
subject to the anti-discrimination requirements of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and,
therefore, the Boy Scouts can deny membership to gay male scouts).
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suffer in society because of the stigma of having a gay parent.7 3 These
cases illustrate my main premise about the law and gay persons:
mention the word "queer," and all legal bets are off!74
Slowly, the courts on either coast began to change as they
understood that these reasons were either erroneous or irrelevant.75
The standard came to be that the "homosexuality" of the parent was
a relevant factor, as were numerous other factors; however,
"homosexuality" per se did not automatically bar the parent from
custody or visitation. Evidence had to show that the sexual
orientation of the parent had a direct adverse effect on the child or
children. However, while some courts became more rational about
such cases, limitations were still imposed in gay cases that were never
imposed in non-gay cases. For example, the lesbian mother received
custody of her child if, and only if, she would make her life-partner
move out of the house. Gay fathers could only visit without their life-
partners and, if the visitation involved an "overnight," the gay father
had to ask his life-partner to leave their home. Thus, "you can have
your child if you give up your relationship." Such a result, arguably,
was not conducive to a stable home life, nor in the best interests of
the child. If the parent then dated, he or she was likely to be accused
of "promiscuity. ' 76 Of course, since gay folks could not marry their
life-partners, many courts justified their actions on the basis that the
parent was involved in a meretricious relationship, resulting in a
classic "Catch 22" situation. Now, courts on both coasts seldom
impose such limitations.
However, the courts in the middle of the country, except in
highly urban areas, have been loath to follow such changes. In many
central states, gay custody issues are still problematic; moreover, the
states are highly idiosyncratic in their approaches. Missouri, in
particular, has been singularly homophobic and just plain mean-
spirited.77 Within the last year, the first, but small, victory for a gay
73. For a discussion of these four factors, see Rivera, Legal Issues, supra note 10, at
199-227.
74. Previously rational people lose it!
75. For an analysis of the effect of geography and date of case on the likelihood of
success for the gay or lesbian parent, see Rhonda R. Rivera and John D'Emilio, Sexual
Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States,
1940-1970,32 U. PA. L. REv. 391 (1984) (book review).
76. I have always liked the following definition of promiscuity: a person is
promiscuous if he or she is getting more than the speaker.
77. See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. App. S.D., 1989). This was a custody
case where the court wrote:
[a]ctually, given its concern for perpetuating the values associated with
parent occurred in Missouri when an appellate court overruled a
restriction on visitation. 78 This case is, unfortunately, still the
exception that proves the rule.
In many states, gay men and lesbians still are not treated fairly in
the domestic relations courts. Even if the state has "good" appellate
law on the issue, few people have the money, time, or energy to
appeal. Moreover, in trial courts, judges who discriminate against gay
parents and who do not wish to be overruled have learned to claim
that the "homosexuality" of the parent was not the real reason for the
denial of custody or visitation; the real reason was the gay parent was
not, in some way, an adequate parent. I remember one Ohio case
where the kids were seen outside during cold weather without their
coats, and this fact was said to illustrate the inadequacy of the lesbian
mother.79
Looking at custody nationally, gay parents, at least in the
"heartland," are still fighting old incorrect stereotypes and losing
their children through the actions of prejudiced judges. In addition,
gay attempts to adopt children, either singly or jointly, are still
anathema to many judges. One of the current big issues is whether
the non-biological parent (i.e., the parent's life partner) can, in
essence, do a step-parent adoption.80 In a sense, gay people are back
conventional marriage and the family as the basic unit of society, the state
has a substantial interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual
behavior which threatens the social fabric, and in endeavoring to protect
minors from being influenced by those who advocate homosexual
lifestyles.
Id. at 792 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1985)). Note the reference
to the Roberts case from Ohio. The result in Roberts shows what happens when the gay
parent hires a lawyer, unfamiliar with sexual orientation law, who introduces absolutely no
favorable evidence.
78. J.A.D. v. F.J.D. III, and Guardian Ad Litem, 978 S.W. 2d 336,339 (MO. 1998). In
this case, the court made this statement: "A homosexual parent is not ipso facto unfit for
custody of his or her child, and no reported Missouri case has held otherwise. It is not
error, however, to consider the impact of homosexual or heterosexual misconduct upon
the children in making a custody determination." Notice the word "misconduct." What is
heterosexual misconduct? Is all homosexual conduct "misconduct?" Missouri does
criminalize sodomy. The results of the case are hardly dramatic; the non-gay father kept
the custody awarded by the trial court, and the mother's visitation limits were remanded.
The appellate court said that only persons whose presence and conduct may (emphasis
added) be contrary to the best interests of the children could be forbidden to see the
children.
79. If every parent whose children ran outside without their coats were denied
custody... ! See Towend v. Towend, No. 635 (Ohio Ct. App. September 30, 1976)
(unpublished opinion).
80. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of: T. K. J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488, 490-91(Colo.
App., 1996) (rehearing and certiorari denied) (affirming lower court's denial of lesbian
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to square one on this issue, with only two states apparently permitting
such an adoption.81 Thus, in many states, the battle has shifted
dramatically from the right to keep one's own children to the right to
so-called step-parent adoptions. So, is the custody glass half empty or
half full?
Many other legal issues exist that affect gay men and lesbians. I
will, however, in this preface, only touch on one more subject area:
gay folks in the military.82 The military has always discriminated de
facto against gay persons. The biggest purge began at the end of
WWII when the war was won and when gays could be safely
expended.83 The military used certain newly-written regulations,
turning the discrimination into a de jure action.84 These regulations
were challenged, starting with Leonard Matlovich. 85 When the
military realized that the regulations contained loopholes, the
regulations were tightened under Reagan to make sure that all gay
people were excluded. Such a policy not only got gay folks out of the
army but also attacked military women, who were often considered
lesbians because they would not sleep with their male colleagues.
Some of the discharges were especially ludicrous., A high-ranking
naval officer directed that all lesbians in his area be discovered and
discharged. He instructed the other officers on how to find the
"lesbians": look for women who are "career-oriented, willing to put
in long hours on the job and among the command's top
professionals. '86
In 1994, President Clinton ineptly tried to keep his political
promise to the gay community. He had promised that he was going to
permit gay folks in the military. A firestorm arose; he backed down,
presaging his handling of many issues to follow. The result was that
partners' petitions to adopt each other's natural children); In Interest of Angel Lace M.,
516 N.W.2d 678, 686-87 (Wis., Jun 08, 1994) (denying adoption by biological mother's
partner).
81. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of Two Children by H. N. R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1995)(reversing, remanding to the trial court, and holding that the children could be
adopted by their biological mother's partner without terminating their mother's parental
rights because the partner's adoption of the children was in the children's best interest).
82. For more on the military see Rivera, supra note 2, at 837-55; Rivera, supra note 4,
at 319-24, and Rivera, Queer Law II, supra note 4, at 287-324.
83. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983).
84. ALLAN BtRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR 11 (1990).
85. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976).
86. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY, VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 720 (1993).
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prior regulations were now changed and, for the first time, the policy
was enacted by Congress. The new policy called "Don't Ask: Don't
Tell" was established.8 7 The policy was painted by the White House
as a protection for gay persons in the military. The result has been
the opposite. A new and more efficient purge has been undertaken,
and, under the new policy, more gay people have been discharged
than under prior policies. 88 The new policy is based on the
presumption that non-gay soldiers and sailors are prejudiced against
gay persons and that the non-gay people, therefore, will have a
"morale" decline and "unit cohesion" would be lost if openly gay
persons are allowed to join the military.89 So gay men and women
must lie to be in the military. In other words, the policy enacts
discrimination. Of course, under the Evans% case, "mere animus"
can not be a reason for governmental action. However, the
Constitution apparently has two standards: one for citizens who are
civilians and one for citizens who are in the military. The Court has
essentially held that the military is a "separate society" and, as such, is
entitled to special deference. 91 This glass is definitely still empty!
I portray what may seem to some a discouraging situation.
Actually, I think that is the wrong conclusion. The "right" solution is
not to be complacent or naive. Many gay men and lesbians are
unconcerned about their legal status until the law directly affects
them. However, as illustrated, much is left for the members of the
gay community to achieve.92 Remember, "when you wake up in bed
with a person of the same sex, you are now in politics. '93
87. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
So far, this policy has been upheld by the federal appellate courts. See Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2nd Cir. 1998), where the court wrote: "We conclude that under
rational basis review section 654 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution."
88. See Steven Lee Myers, Gay Group's Study Finds Military Harassment Rising, N. Y.
TIMES, March 15, 1999, at A14 ("In January, the Pentagon reported that the Army, Navy,
Air Force and Marine Corps discharged 1,145 gay men and lesbians in the 1998 fiscal year,
a 13 percent increase from the year before and nearly double the number in 1993, the year
before the policy took effect."). See also Steven Lee Myers, Despite 'Don't Ask' Policy,
Gay Ousters Rose in '98, January 13, 1999, N. Y. TIMES, at A15.
89. Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1
Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 142 (1995).
90. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 632.
91. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
92. For a great article on litigation strategy, see Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick
and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45,45 (1996).
93. Originally said by R. Rivera and quoted in J. Jacobs, Activism elsewhere buoys
movement in Columbus, Ohio, S.F. Examiner, June 13, 1989, p. A15.
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